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WHO SPEAKS THE CULTURE
OF THE CORPORATION?
Gwendolyn Gordon*
Recent cases – Burwell v Hobby Lobby Stores and Citizens United
chief among them – evince a new understanding of the nature of the corpo-
ration and its place in society.  Whether a corporation has rights – such as
those of religious exercise – is not, however, just a question of legal inter-
pretation.  To answer this question requires a theory of group or cultural
identity, that is, a theory of how a group may have “culture” separate and
apart from those of the individuals that comprise it. And such a theory
must address how to understand the meaning of culture when the beliefs of
people within the group diverge.  However, the Supreme Court’s analysis
has fallen short by glossing over this step in the analysis.  In Hobby Lobby,
the Supreme Court indicated that the question of the religious identity of
the corporation might easily be resolved by the semi-democracy of state
corporate law: those shareholders and managers controlling the corpora-
tion, that is, decide the identity of the corporation.  As Justice Ginsburg
noted in her dissent, however, in the case of religious belief, things can get
fairly gnarly.  This Article critiques the Supreme Court’s oversimplified
view of how group identity is formed using anthropology as its guide.  This
anthropological approach argues that the question of corporate “culture” is
far more complex than the Court’s jurisprudence acknowledges.  This ap-
proach requires rethinking the corporate rights doctrine and its assump-
tions about shareholder democracy.  One or the other must fall – either the
notion that corporations have cultural rights such as those of a “religion,”
or the processes of majority shareholder voting that do not track an in-
grained cultural identity.
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INTRODUCTION
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Supreme Court indicated that
the question of the religious identity of the corporation might easily be
resolved by the semi-democracy of state corporate law: the controlling
party or parties, that is, decide the cultural identity of the corporation.1
The case forms part of a set of recent Supreme Court decisions that have
begun to instantiate a unique theory of the corporation.2  In these cases,
the Court reconceptualized corporations in such a way as to essentially
conflate and equate the personal rights of the corporation with those of
the human persons controlling them.  I call the result of this shift the con-
tingent corporation.3  The term highlights the processes by which a simpli-
fied notion of corporate personhood makes it easier to assign to the
corporation-as-entity the characteristics, social ties, civic commitments,
and internal lives of the aggregate of humans involved with it.
The present article explores one consequence of the new vision of the
corporation I outline: its meaning for shareholder voting.
Majority rule may be seen to be well suited to the types of disputes
through which corporate law has developed: those regarding the distribu-
tion of the corporations’ profits.  In the case of religious belief and exer-
cise in closely held corporations, however, the propriety of majority rule
becomes much less certain.4
In the wake of Hobby Lobby, new rules were proposed outlining what
a closely held corporation means for the purposes of religious exercise ex-
emptions to the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).5  The rules specify group-
rights attached to corporate control, but they leave unanswered a number
of questions regarding the freedoms of individual persons.
Imagine that some member of the Hahn or the Green families (the
families controlling the corporations in Hobby Lobby) began to re-think
his family’s version of Christianity.  Imagine that he disagreed with his
family’s determination not to subsidize birth control.  Imagine further that
he came to believe this behavior to be precisely the opposite of Christian.
As things stand now, the corporation’s “exercise” of religion is entirely
dependent upon the will of the shareholders or managers in control.  The
religious preferences of our renegade Hahn or Green become silenced—
overwhelmed by the actions and identity of the corporation.  Ought the
law leave matters of corporate belief to majority rule in the same way that
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Hobby Lobby, 134 S.
Ct. 2751.
3. See Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353
(2016). Here, I look to the concept of culture in corporate law to theorize this set of develop-
ments, and specifically at the way that jurists articulate their understandings of the relation-
ship between homogeny and group formation.
4. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2797 n.19 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
5. See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001
(2010); 45 C.F.R. 147.131 (2015).
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it leaves matters of corporate distribution, or are these matters different in
some material way?
Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson, considering the question in re-
gard to corporate political speech, argue that there absolutely is a differ-
ence: the personal nature of political speech decisions renders them
different from ordinary business decisions. Like other such decisions, po-
litical speech decisions ought to be subject to special rules to protect share-
holders from action by directors stemming from interests divergent from
those of the shareholders.6  To meet this challenge, Bebchuk and Jackson
suggest rules buttressing shareholder input and shifting oversight responsi-
bilities to independent directors; mechanisms by which shareholders may
opt out of these rules; and the bolstering of disclosure rules.  To protect
minorities from “forced association” with the corporation’s speech,
Bebchuk and Jackson suggest procedural rules requiring strong
supermajorities.7
That Bebchuk and Jackson are so staunch in their defense of dissent-
ers’ rights aligns with the central importance of the freedom of speech in
American legal culture.  Political and religious preferences belong to a
class we might call “close concerns”: those with regard to a subset of ex-
pressive rights based in personal attributes, and traditionally considered
applicable only to natural persons.8
Yet religion is different again.  In the traditions of American law, free-
dom of and from religion is fundamentally intertwined with individual
human choice, and primarily justified with reference to individual human
potential.9  While political decisions are developed in compromise with
6. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010) [hereinafter Corporate Political Speech: Who
Decides?].
7. Id. at 115-17.
8. Martin Redish has described the guarantee of freedom of speech as “a catalyst in
tapping and developing the uniquely human creative and intellectual capacities of the indi-
vidual.” Martin H. Redish, The Role of Pathology in First Amendment Theory: A Skeptical
Examination, 38 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 618, 627 (1988). See also MARTIN H. REDISH, FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 21 (1984) (“a use, and therefore a development,
of an individual’s uniquely human faculties”); Howard M. Wasserman, Compelled Expression
and the Public Forum Doctrine, 77 TUL. L. REV. 163, 190-193 (2002) (discussing individual
liberty as the primary concern underlying freedom of speech).
9. See, e.g., Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559 (1989) (outlining the history and animating principles of religious
liberty in American constitutional law and politics); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A
Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001); Gail Merel, The
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First
Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 805, 810-11 (1978) (“If there is any single unifying principle
underlying the two religion clauses, therefore, it is that individual choice in matters of relig-
ion should remain free: individual decisions are to be protected whether they operate for or
against the validity of any or all religious views.”); Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and
Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990); KENT
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION, VOL 1: FREE EXERCISE AND FAIRNESS
(2006).
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others—a central basis of the American commitment to democracy—one’s
religious belief and religious exercise are matters not best left to commit-
tee.  In the American imagination, each person makes his or her own deci-
sions with regard to his or her relationship to religion.
Thus, while Bebchuk and Jackson’s approach provides a sound starting
point for considering corporate speech issues, it cannot reach some impor-
tant issues brought into relief with the Supreme Court’s articulation of the
image of the contingent corporation.  Their argument stems from concerns
for shareholder wealth maximization, and is built on related assumptions
that become problematic post-Hobby Lobby.  According to their reason-
ing, an improved decision-making apparatus for the corporation’s political
speech appears to be necessary primarily because of the tendency for such
decisions to affect shareholder wealth.  Even the expressive significance of
such decision-making must then be analyzed in terms of the calculation of
agency costs.10
With Hobby Lobby, the Supreme Court at last acknowledged, and ap-
peared to accept, a stance that had been voiced for many decades: the
argument that maximization of shareholder financial wealth is not the only
legitimate purpose for a for-profit corporation.11  Further, the Court
hinted that the interests of directors, employees, and other non-share-
holder constituencies as individuals might matter in terms of the appraisal
10. Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, supra note 6, at 95-96.
11. E.g., David K. Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223 (1991);
Lawrence Mitchell, A Theoretical And Practical Framework For Enforcing Corporate Con-
stituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1992); Marleen A. O’Connor, Human Capital ERA:
Reconceptualizing Corporate Law To Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 COR-
NELL L. REV. 899 (1993); Lawrence Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Cor-
poration: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995);
David J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees,
Revisited 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996); LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, PROGRESSIVE CORPO-
RATE LAW (1995) (challenging shareholder primacy from communitarian or progressive cor-
porate law stances); Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership,
62 MOD. L. REV. 32, 32-57 (1999) (arguing that in Britain, shareholder ownership of the
company ruled in the popular imagination as foundational to company law while lawyers
merely mummed along: “Company lawyers, while generally skirting this issue, sometimes
acknowledge that shareholders are not ‘owners’ of the company in the usual sense of the
word. They tend to assume, however, that they have a proprietal interest in the company akin
to ownership, hence, for example, the widespread references to ‘the separation of ownership
and control.’ Non-lawyers tend to be less hesitant.”); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A
Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 257 (1999) (“despite the
growing popularity of shareholder primacy rhetoric among academics and commenta-
tors. . .corporate law itself has so far rejected the shareholder primacy norm and refused to
give shareholders tighter legal control over directors.”); ERIC W. ORTS, BUSINESS PERSONS:
A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM (2013) (“There is no natural law of corporations, for exam-
ple, that mandates ‘shareholder value maximization’ as the only permissible goal of manage-
ment. This mantra is merely a prescription recommended by some economic theories of the
firm.”). It must, however, be acknowledged that the Court appeared to de-legitimate the
centrality of shareholder wealth maximization – not shareholder primacy.
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of corporate religious claims.12  To properly deal with this variety of inter-
ests, we need an account that does not depend so heavily on an assump-
tion of shareholder wealth maximization as its primary concern.13
Constitutional questions relating to corporate political speech and re-
ligious exercise have been hotly debated in the wake of Citizens United
and Hobby Lobby.  Among these have been concerns for establishment
clause and forced speech claims.14  In this article, rather than focus on
these constitutional questions, I get down to corporate law brass tacks: I
focus upon what the changes introduced by Citizens United and Hobby
Lobby ought to mean for state law, and how courts might face them.
In Citizens United, the Court presented as a fait accompli a simplified
mode of analyzing corporate rights—one that presumed that constitu-
tional protections traditionally considered applicable only to natural per-
sons are both properly extended to corporations and coterminous with
protections of political speech for human speakers.
In Hobby Lobby, the Court gave its imprimatur to the prioritization of
values outside of profit.  The primary protections in place for minority
shareholder interests were acceptable because (1) the subject of those pro-
tections were interests that, unlike religious beliefs, could essentially be
described in economic terms; and (2) profit was accepted as the be-all and
end-all. Hobby Lobby has brought into play more personal interests,
while simultaneously having destabilized the efficiency-based reasoning
that legitimized majority rule.  It is not enough to hew to business as
usual—to majority rule—when rights of such importance are at stake.  We
are in a different world, and we must seek a conceptual language for deal-
ing with this difference.
This inquiry treads two paths. My anthropologist’s heart wonders: how
are we to understand the nature of a corporate belief where the beliefs of
minority shareholders diverge in the face of those of the majority?  How
are we to understand what Adolf Berle might have imagined as the collec-
tive spiritual sensibility of the corporation?15  My question as a legal
scholar then becomes: in the face of the articulation of conceptual limits
post-Hobby Lobby, how should “belief” or “opinion” or “culture” or
12. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768 (“An established body of law specifies the rights
and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are asso-
ciated with a corporation in one way or another.”).
13. After Hobby Lobby, even political concerns may be susceptible to some such
broader analytic.
14. While constitutional issues are not my focus here, other commentators have noted
the “quasi-constitutional” nature of corporate law post-Citizens United and -Hobby Lobby
(see, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639
(2016)). My particular concerns – which go to the ordinary functioning of business – are
likely not amenable to establishment clause protection. Nonetheless, these seemingly quotid-
ian interests need protection.
15. ADOLF A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 148
(1955).
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other minority shareholder non-”business” preferences matter in state cor-
porate law?
It becomes clear that these developments do not merely provide the
occasion to consider the dealings of corporate law with the personal pref-
erences of minority shareholders.  They also demand a re-evaluation of
the role of majority rule in corporate governance.
I. THE DIVERSITY OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS
There is no one all-encompassing definition of the “closely held” busi-
ness corporation.16 Definitions differ in terms of their colloquial or official
usages, and these may not in fact be clearly delineated from each other.17
Colloquially speaking, to describe a corporation as closely held might be
to indicate any or many of several characteristics: for example, the corpo-
ration may have a small number of shareholders, or a small number of
employees, or a limited market for its shares. Legally speaking, however,
there are specific definitions, differing state-to-state.18
What are the implications of “closeness”?  Why does closeness make a
difference here?19
Social science has long acknowledged the problematic nature of the
assumption of greater homogeny in smaller social groupings—tribes, fami-
lies, villages.20  Indeed, in many cases—Hobby Lobby included—jurists
16. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered
Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 756 n.33 (2000).
17. Id (quoting WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON CORPORATIONS 389 (7th ed. 1995) (unabridged) (“Exactly what constitutes a close
corporation is often a matter of theoretical dispute. Some authorities emphasize the number
of shareholders, some the lack of a market for the corporation’s stock, and some the exis-
tence of formal restrictions on the transferability of the corporation’s shares.”); citing 1 F.
HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 4-7
(3d ed. 1994) (“noting the following possible definitions of a ‘close corporation’: a corpora-
tion with relatively few shareholders; a corporation whose shares are not generally traded in
the securities markets; a corporation in which the participants consider themselves partners
interse; a corporation in which management and ownership are substantially identical; and
any corporation which elects to place itself in a close corporation grouping”)).
18. Moll, supra note 16, at 756, n.33. (“Nevertheless, the typical close corporation pos-
sesses most, if not all, of the attributes described in these various definitions.”).
19. F. Hodge O’Neal, Close Corporation Legislation: A Survey and an Evaluation,
1972 DUKE L.J. 867, 867 (1972) (“Many corporate concepts and principles, undoubtedly cre-
ated with public-issue corporations primarily in mind, are ill-adapted to close corporations.”).
20. For example, in sociologist and philosopher Emile Durkheim’s view, solidarity re-
quires conflict. Groups in this conceptualization are not so much entities as ongoing
processes; their existence arises out of, is dependent upon, and may be described by a state of
tension between mechanical togetherness and organic entropy. Instead of contradicting or
negating each other, each becomes the condition for the other. See Gordon, supra note 3, at
379-382. For a very swift introduction to these themes as expressed in anthropological re-
search, see generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE: TWENTIETH CEN-
TURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE AND ART (1988); JEAN COMAROFF & JOHN L.
COMAROFF, ETHNICITY, INC., (2009) (discussing the complexity of ethnically differentiated
groups’ engagements with capitalist enterprise); JOHANNES FABIAN, TIME AND THE OTHER:
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too have acknowledged the irreducible heterogeneity of the group.21 The
greater ease in imagining the closely held corporation as possessing race,
or ethnicity, or religion appears, then, connected to how one imagines the
interplay of group dynamics.
But if shareholders are not owners in the way usually imagined—as
many have argued,22 and as was arguably endorsed in Hobby Lobby—and
if we mean to link what “the people” think to what the corporation is—
Christian, non-religious, black, what-have-you—then we must take seri-
ously, somehow, these heterogeneous preferences.  These issues regarding
who makes up the corporation are all bound up in the question of how
groups form and what that means for the heterogeneity of its elements.  Of
how interests ought to be privileged or subjugated in describing what “the
group” thinks.  Of whose voice should rule where there is heterogeneity in
individual preferences.  Of who may speak for the group, and based on
what type of authority— consensus? Democracy? Fiat?23
HOW ANTHROPOLOGY MAKES ITS OBJECT (2002) (unsettling classical anthropological per-
ceptions of tribal and indigenous societies as timeless, homogenous “others”); AKHIL GUPTA
ET AL., CULTURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, (Akhil
Gupta & James Ferguson, eds., 1997) (challenging the naturalization of links between “place”
and culture); see generally, PAUL NADASDY, TRANSCENDING THE DEBATE OVER THE ECO-
LOGICALLY NOBLE INDIAN: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND ENVIRONMENTALISM, ETHNOHIS-
TORY 52 Ethnohistory 2, 291 (2005); GANANATH OBEYESEKERE, THE APOTHEOSIS OF
CAPTAIN COOK: EUROPEAN MYTHMAKING IN THE PACIFIC (Princeton University Press 1997)
(arguing the existence of particular epistemologies for indigenous and tribal societies); Eliza-
beth A. Povinelli, Consuming Geist: Popontology and the Spirit of Capital in Indigenous Aus-
tralia, 12 PUBLIC CULTURE 501, 501-528 (2000) (describing the fetishization into “real
culture” of indigenous internal struggles regarding deontological orders, of the frictions be-
tween simultaneous, antithetical compulsory strictures—of conflicting requirements to indig-
enous and non-indigenous social demands); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE
REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1993) (reflexivity and positionality can allow modern-day
anthropologists to understand their interlocutors as contingent and granular subjects in a
manner inaccessible to classic ethnography); MARSHALL SAHLINS, HOW “NATIVES” THINK:
ABOUT CAPTAIN COOK, FOR EXAMPLE (1996) (countering OBEYESEKERE, supra note 20, to
argue for the legibility to anthropological interpretation of contemporary indigenous peo-
ples’ perceptions of the death of Captain Cook); MICHAEL TAUSSIG, MIMESIS AND ALTER-
ITY: A PARTICULAR HISTORY OF THE SENSES (1992) (demonstrating a connection between
mimesis and colonial powers’ conceptions of tribal peoples as “savages”); ERIC WOLF, EU-
ROPE AND THE PEOPLE WITHOUT HISTORY (2nd ed. 2010) (challenging then-current beliefs
that the small-scale societies anthropologists studied were static and monolithic).
21. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at  2774-75 (“HHS and the principal dissent express con-
cern about the possibility of disputes among the owners of corporations, but that is not a
problem that arises because of RFRA or that is unique to this context. The owners of closely
held corporations may—and sometimes do—disagree about the conduct of business.”).
22. See, e.g., William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder
Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010).
23. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, Corporate Political Speech, Political Extortion, and the
Competition for Corporate Charters, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1103, 1118-20 (2002) (arguing that
minority shareholders can simply leave); id. at 1120-22 (arguing that Easterbrook and Fis-
chel’s ideas regarding voting rights proportional to stake obtain in the arena of corporate
political speech) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26 J.L. & ECON. 395, 395-427, and 405-409 (1983)); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson
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The answer to this question is either incredibly simple or exquisitely
complicated.
II. WHOSE PREFERENCES SHOULD MATTER, AND HOW?
In considering a corporation’s personal attributes, we have to know at
which constituencies we ought to look to find them.  One standard account
holds this group to be shareholders alone; implied or explicit within this
account is the idea that it is the interests of the majority of the sharehold-
ers that matters, rather than, say, those of the corporation as an entity.
Both of these ideas have been subject to critique, and both become yet
more problematic post-Citizens United and Hobby Lobby. And yet we
have to look somewhere for group preferences. Where?
A. The Easy Answer: Majority Rules
Majority rule rules in the corporate law of every state.  Easterbrook
and Fischel mark as “the most basic statutory rule” of voting in corporate
law the idea that “[a]ll common shares vote, all votes have the same
weight, and no other participant in the venture votes, unless there is some
express agreement to the contrary.”24  While acknowledging arguments
that this state of affairs is undemocratic because those with more shares
Jr., Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83, 97-111 (2010) (arguing
that corporations’ decisions around who it is who speaks and what it is the corporation will
say in undertaking political speech should have more shareholder input; the procedures for
making these decisions should more closely resemble those established for special corporate
decisions); Scholars’ formal and informal discourse in the immediate wake of Hobby Lobby
was notable for the extent to which it circulated around these questions. See, e.g., Grant
Hayden & Matthew Bodie, Who Controls Corporate Culture?, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH
(July 16, 2014), http://www.stltoday.com/news/opinion/columns/who-controls-corporate-cul-
ture/article_5dbb9b4c-8c6e-500e-9c3f-2a2a4abe18c3.html [hereinafter Who Controls Corpo-
rate Culture?] (“It’s not just that Hobby Lobby chose to exercise its religious principles in a
certain way—its 13,000 employees had no say whatsoever in the exercise of those princi-
ples.”); Ann Lipton, Yet Another Person Weighs in on Hobby Lobby, LAW PROFESSOR
BLOGS NETWORK (July 12, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/yet-
another-person-weighs-in-on-hobby-lobby.html (“Justice Alito couldn’t neglect employees in
his description of the corporation in Hobby Lobby. Yet immediately after this explanation,
he reads employees out of the equation.  This was necessary to reach the result—after all, if
Justice Alito admitted that employees, as much as owners and controllers, make up the cor-
porate entity, he would have been forced to recognize that many of these employees do not
share the religious beliefs of the owners and controllers, and the religious identity of the
corporation as a whole would not have been so clear.”); Elizabeth Sepper, Contraception and
the Birth of Corporate Conscience, 22 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 303, 319 (2014).
24. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 408 (1983) [hereinafter Voting in Corporate Law].
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have more votes,25 Easterbrook and Fischel regard the current state of
affairs to be “a logical consequence of the function of voting.”26
One formerly common alternative to the current “one share one vote”
norm, cumulative voting, weighted minority voter preferences—putatively
improving the deliberation process by easing the ability for otherwise less-
powerful shareholders to have a say in corporate governance.  Yet cumula-
tive voting, note Easterbrook and Fischel, has become practically extinct,
at least in publicly traded firms.27
The writers see this as a natural outcome of its costs: in over-weighting
minority shares, cumulative voting renders the decision-making process
more inclusive, and thus likely less efficient.  It is this “lumpiness” that
Easterbrook and Fischel see as the greatest flaw in cumulative voting and
in other schemes to empower minority shares; a lumpiness that “makes
realignments of control blocs very difficult by distributing a form of
holdup power widely.”28
But this is not a problem merely of costs and efficiencies.  Easterbrook
and Fischel’s position also articulates something of their theory of group
preferences and thus of the social values underlying their contractual
stance: Hayden and Bodie describe profit-centricism such as that evinced
here as a utilitarian approach oriented primarily toward public choice.29
As a way of theorizing corporate law, it “generally seeks to foster a system
of corporate governance that maximizes overall individual utility.”30  But
since there is no such thing as a normativity-free zone, a commitment to
shareholder primacy is also a commitment to the idea “that maximizing
shareholder wealth is in the best interests of society.”31  An efficient deci-
sion-making process cuts less dramatically into the resources of the corpo-
ration; a lumpy process risks “expos[ing] the firm to an uncompensated
risk of making inconsistent or illogical decisions.”32  The real harm of cu-
25. See David Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections
on the Rule of “One Share, One Vote,” 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970) (making the argument
that the rule of “one share, one vote” is undemocratic).
26. Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 408-409 (“Voting flows with the
residual interest in the firm, and unless each element of the residual interest carries an equal
voting right, there will be a needless agency cost of management.”).
27. Id. at 409.
28. Id.
29. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy And The Curious
Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV.2071, 2081 (2010) [hereinafter Share-
holder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy].
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2082.
32. WOLF-GEORGE RINGE, THE DECONSTRUCTION OF EQUITY: ACTIVIST SHARE-
HOLDERS, DECOUPLED RISK, AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 93 (Oxford University Press
2016).  Arguing for a broadening of the electorate to non-shareholder constituents, Hayden
and Bodie note that “[i]n justifying the limitation of the franchise to shareholders, scholars
have repeatedly turned to social choice theory – specifically Arrow’s theorem.” Grant Hay-
den & Matthew Bodie, Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, 62 Vand.
L. Rev. 1215, 1219 (2009) [hereinafter Arrow’s Theorem and the Exclusive Shareholder
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mulative voting, then, is in its inability to capture (to paraphrase Bernard
Grofman) what most of the people want.33
In the face of these and other practical issues and theoretical quanda-
ries, “one share, one vote” and majority rule are dominant in today’s cor-
porate law arenas.34  Dominant but—importantly—not entirely
unqualified.  Adolf Berle wrote that while “[t]he corporation was formed
and existed to make money for its stockholders . . . several other consider-
ations have been added to the picture.”35 Previously, “[i]n case of disa-
greement, the majority holders, having the largest interest at stake in the
profits, would have the most powerful motivation in the direction of sound
profit-making personnel and policy. This, after all, was what control was
all about.”36
As Berle wrote in 1958, however, things had shifted: in the face of
motivations like directors’ and officers’ perks, corporate empire-building,
or the effect of the graduated income tax on shareholders’ preferences for
dividend distribution, profit-maximization might be “a secondary inter-
est.”37 Further, the single-minded pursuit of profit in the name of the ma-
jority shareholders was now limited by the keen interest of the public in
the question of the impact of such single-mindedness upon society.38
Control thus became “essentially a variety of political process—non-
statist and therefore, in our vocabulary, ‘private,’ but with substantial pub-
lic responsibilities.”39  It is in recognition of this political character of cor-
porate control that Berle emphasized limitations to majority rule: as in
American democracy, minority and other interests would necessarily be
Franchise]. Hayden and Bodie argue that this preference for the reduction of multiple
“peaks” may not be empirically supported – in fact, lumpy, spiky, diverse decision making
processes may result in more considered decisions. See also, Shareholder Democracy And
The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, supra note 29, at 2103 (citing Lynne L. Dallas,
The New Managerialism and Diversity on Corporate Boards of Directors, 76 TUL. L. REV.
1363, 1388-1405 (2002)).
33. See Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civic Republicanism, and American Politics:
Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1549 (as quoted in
Shareholder Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, supra note 29, at
2080).
34. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholders and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119
(2003) (quoting 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDA-
TIONS, pt. 7, ch. 4, introductory note (1994) (describing corporate law as a “largely unquali-
fied system of majoritarian control”)).
35. Adolf A. Berle, “Control” in Corporate Law, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1214 (1958)
[hereinafter Control in Corporate Law].
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1215 (“[T]he community now has a vivid interest in the policies and opera-
tions of corporations, especially the giants in the field. They administer the essential services
of supply in the current American economy. Their failure to function reason- ably well in
many key situations could bring disaster or at least hardship to substantial sectors of the
population.”).
39. Id.
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shielded to some extent from the brute force of the interests of the major-
ity, as “[w]ithout some means of organization”—some limits—”the system
would probably break down.”40
Thus it is that these limits, far from being a side-note, become existen-
tially important to corporate finance.41
Even as scholars have addressed over the past decades the practical
ineffectiveness or theoretical red-herring status of the shareholder vote,42
there are a number of transactions in which shareholder input has a pro-
nounced effect on the actual actions of the corporation.  For example, note
Easterbrook and Fischel, “[s]tatutes in every state require votes to be
taken on certain ‘fundamental’ transactions, such as mergers and sales of
substantially all the assets of the firm.”43  The voice of the majority share-
holders matters.
Yet to leave the issue to corporate democracy in its current guise ap-
pears to end the discussion before it starts.  Ultimately, the religious be-
liefs that ought, in the Hobby Lobby Court’s estimation, to rule the
corporation’s “beliefs” are simply those of the controlling shareholders-
officers (in the relevant companies, these were the same people).  But
Hobby Lobby itself destabilized the propriety of such a route, both by
leaving such a sensitive question to majority rule and by destabilizing the
very profit focus thought to justify such deferral to majority rule.  Thus the
facility of the easy answer implies the importance, and the promise, of the
more complex one.
B. The Gnarly Answer
The easy answer leaves open the questions of why shareholder beliefs
are the sole indicator for corporate belief, why controlling shareholders’
beliefs ought to be allowed to outweigh those of others, and why belief
should be left up to democracy in the first place.  Given the centrality of
the freedom of religion in American law and society, may we legitimately
leave the determination of belief to what arguably amounts to
plutocracy?44
40. Id. at 1216.
41. “[T]he ALI carefully observes that ‘unless counterbalanced, majoritarian control
also creates a potential risk for many investors.’” Chander, supra note 34, at 127 n.34, (quot-
ing ALI, 2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS, pt.
7, ch. 4, introductory note (1994)).
42. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24; Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of
the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 682-694 (2007).
43. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 24, at 400, 415.
44. “In Hobby Lobby, the Court suggests that wealth determines religion, because
state corporate law will resolve intra-corporate disputes according to who owns the most
voting shares of the company.” Sarah Haan, Closely Held Means “Controlling Shareholder”?,
BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (July 10, 2014), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2014/07/
guest-post-closely-held-means-controlling-shareholder.html.
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In the narrative of shareholder primacy, corporations’ characteristics
are commonly cast as those of “the shareholders” —with shareholders
imagined as its “owners” and (the argument goes) thus natural recipients
of the franchise.  Scholars have challenged this stance by means of argu-
ments dismantling the assumption of a legal requirement for business cor-
porations to hold profit as primary.45  Still, many of these arguments do
not necessarily delegitimize shareholder-centric reasoning.
While some have viewed Hobby Lobby as an affirmation of these chal-
lenges, others note that while the decision disclaims share value as the
only legitimate goal of business, it very much does not decenter share-
holder preferences.  Instead, the reasoning in Hobby Lobby uses the
desires and characteristics of the controlling shareholders-officers as the
central consideration in determining the characteristics of the
corporation.46
The Court considered this a valid way to work because the corporation
was closely held.  The closer the imagined link between shareholders and
the corporation appears, the easier the conceptual transfer of the former’s
identities, rights, and preferences to the latter.47
The reasoning in Hobby Lobby appears to suggest that the priorities
and preferences of those controlling the closely held corporation are those
of the corporation – that is, to suggest that these closely held corporations
have no factor meaningfully distinguishing their form from that of a part-
45. E.g., Paddy Ireland, Company Law and the Myth of Shareholder Ownership, 62
MOD. L. REV. 32, 32-57 (1999); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247-328 (1999); ORTS, supra note 11 at 54-62,
78-84.
46. See Gordon, supra note 3, at 373 n.67. (“That belief matters is, uncontroversially,
an essential part of a free exercise claim; RFRA’s definition of the free exercise of religion,
while discrete and distinct from that within the First Amendment, does not excise this re-
quirement. Although RFRA analysis does not demand evidence that an exercise be ‘com-
pelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,’ the requirement of the presence of the
assertion of belief in some such system is quite clear. Regarding the ability of the corporate
entity to have beliefs, the Court cited as ‘true—but quite beside the point.’ Hobby Lobby,
134 S. Ct. at 2768. The Third Circuit also stated that ‘[g]eneral business corporations do not,
separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees,
exercise religion,’ Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385 (3d Cir. 2013) (emphasis added). But the Court does not
read the beliefs of the corporation to be ‘separate and apart from’ those of the corporate
entity: ‘Corporations, “separate and apart from” the human beings who own, run, and are
employed by them, cannot do anything at all.’ Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768. The Court is
able to minimize discussion of the beliefs of the corporation ‘on its own terms’ —the beliefs
of the corporation ‘itself’—precisely because with this comment it made coterminous the
beliefs of the corporation and the beliefs of the human beings (specifically the controlling
human beings) associated with it.”).
47. Gwendolyn Gordon, Culture in Corporate Law or: A Black Corporation, a Chris-
tian Corporation, and a Maˆori Corporation Walk into a Bar . . ., 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353,
375 (2016) [hereinafter Culture in Corporate Law].
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nership. The claim makes a measure of sense: shareholder status evolved
out of partnership status.48  But historical context is crucial here.
Before modern notions of shareholder status began to develop in the
late 1800s, corporations were smaller and less complex, individual share-
holding was more prevalent and more concentrated, and shareholder sta-
tus much more closely resembled partnership status.49  During that time,
the distinction between the partnership form and the corporate form was
weak.50 Since that time, however, the idea that a corporation is an entity
unto itself (unlike a partnership, which is considered the aggregate of the
partners) has grown in strength dramatically.51
Even for closely held organizations, the corporation is not its owners,
and its interests are not theirs.52  The corporation’s attractiveness as an
organizational option for the conduct of business stems to a great extent
from this characteristic.  Its status as a legal person is dependent upon the
differentiation of the corporation’s assets and liabilities from the assets
and liabilities of its shareholders.53  The obvious justification for the doc-
trine of limited liability in the event of the corporation’s failure is the
shareholder’s acceptance of limited control in the corporation’s behavior.
Supporting this view is that in virtually every case in which the question of
limited liability arose for publicly held corporations, the doctrine was
mostly ironclad.54 But, while (at least in theory) the chance of veil piercing
becomes more likely the smaller (in terms of both number of equity own-
ers and number of employees) the corporation at issue, the doctrine of
limited liability applieseven for corporations owned and operated by a sin-
48. Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63 CAMBRIDGE
L.J. 456, 456-506 (2004).
49. David K. Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 201 DUKE L.J. 201, 205-206; 214-15
(1990).
50. See id. at 215. This is especially clear, David Millon has argued, in the decline of
the unanimity requirement in voting and the reconceptualization of the sources from which
managers received their powers from actual delegation by the shareholders to powers as a
matter of law.
51. Id.
52. But see Amy Sepinwall, Corporate Piety and Impropriety: Hobby Lobby’s Exten-
sion of RFRA Rights to the For-Profit Corporation, HARV. BUS. L. REV. 173, 192 (2015)
(“The fact that some of the corporation’s obligations, powers, and privileges are different
from those of its owners need not entail that all must be. . . . [T]he veil, just like the corpora-
tion, is, to paraphrase John Marshall, ‘an artificial’ construct, ‘existing only in contemplation
of law.’ As such, the extent of the veil’s coverage or porosity is a matter for the law to
decide.”) (citations omitted).
53. It should be noted that the inverse is not necessarily the case; the organization’s
status as limited in liability depends neither upon the personhood metaphor nor even upon
its status as a corporation. Further, the Greens of Hobby Lobby and the Hahns of Conestoga,
for instance, did not need to establish their businesses as corporations to gain the protections
of limited liability. See generally, Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751; Conestoga, 724 F.3d 377, 385
(3d Cir. 2013)
54. ORTS, supra note 11 at 160.
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gle individual.55 The result is that our existing view of corporate per-
sonhood cannot satisfactorily explain the strength of the limited liability
doctrine.
Hobby Lobby lends credence to an imagining of the corporate person
neither as a mere aggregate of the persons involved in the undertaking nor
as separate entity from its shareholders, but as an entity whose personal
characteristics arise directly from them.56  In none of these views of the
corporation were the shareholders at risk of personal liability for the be-
havior of the corporation. Instead, what was at risk was a benefit to the
corporation: its ability to avoid insurance payments. In each case, the per-
sonal interests of the shareholders came to justify the extension to the
corporation-as-entity these rights and benefits—a process that might be
described as “reverse veil piercing.”57
Although an empirical examination of the question is beyond the
scope of this piece, one might conjecture that, at least in Hobby Lobby,
the reverse veil piercing of Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood
worked in the eyes of the court, where it would not have with a different
set of organizations, because of this same elision of differences between
shareholder and corporate personalities. The courts’ notions of the suita-
bility of both veil piercing and reverse veil piercing in a particular circum-
stance might, in turn, come down to the tendency to imagine small or
closely-held organizations as more closely resembling the imagined ho-
mogenous people holding them.
The assumptions underpinning conceptions that more closely held cor-
porations are able to “have” singular “culture,” race, or political opinions
thus appear to be related to an idea of numerically smaller groups as more
homogenous in terms of values and more stable in terms of preferences—
and with a greater connection between the personalities and preferences
of the individuals associated with the corporation and the organization’s
actions.  As Justice Ginsburg notes in her Hobby Lobby dissent, however,
55. ORTS, supra note 11, at 158 (“The economic and ethical arguments that support
limited liability for equity owners of very large corporate enterprises become less convincing
for smaller firms (or large firms in economic size with only a few equity owners). These firms
do not depend on large numbers of investors who participate in public stock markets. And
management responsibility tends to coincide with ownership interests much more directly
than in large firms. The organizational distance between owners and managers in smaller
firms is considerably lessened and sometimes completely eliminated. In other words, there is
often no ‘separation of ownership and control.’”).
56. Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of Corporate Con-
stitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673 (2015).
57. See generally, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Using Reverse Veil Piercing to Vindicate the
Free Exercise Rights of Incorporated Employers, 16 GREEN BAG 235, 235- (2013) (reverse
veil-piercing defined as a doctrine by which a court will disregard a corporation’s separate
legal personality in the interests of its controlling insiders); Elizabeth Sepper, Religion, Inc.,
A Reply to Bainbridge, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Aug. 2, 2013), http://clsbluesky.law.co-
lumbia.edu/2013/08/02/religion-inc-a-reply-to-bainbridge/comment-page-1/.
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“close” does not mean “small.”58  Ginsburg directs her colleagues to note
that the majority’s reasoning renders plausible RFRA claims by public or
private corporations “of any size.”59  Hobby Lobby Stores, for one, is not
diffusely owned, but it has thousands of employees (of diverse faiths, as
Justice Ginsburg points out).
But if “closely held” is not coterminous with “small,” neither is either
coterminous with “homogenous in shareholder characteristics.”  The
Court, failing to delimit what, precisely, it meant in using the term “closely
held,” left it open to interpretation and resistant to bounds—was the sim-
ple legal characteristic of “closeness” (however that may be defined) suffi-
cient to validate a vision of the characteristics of the corporation as
directly coterminous with its controlling shareholders?
While the Court professed its confidence that its analytic focus upon
the closely held nature of Hobby Lobby and Conestoga Wood would serve
to limit to the opinion’s broad application, the opinion held little discus-
sion of the characteristics that make a corporation “closely held” in such a
way as to enable the Court to confidently state that it seemed “unlikely
that the sort of [publicly traded] corporate giants to which HHS [U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services] refers will often assert RFRA
claims.”60
Since the way the Court uses the phrase is so loose, there is clearly
some unstated set of characteristics that is motivating the Court’s analy-
sis—beyond the characteristics in the applicable legal concept—that might
distinguish a corporation’s status as what we might call “Hobby Lobby
close” versus close in a way that would make the result in the case inap-
propriate to it.
Something must motivate the assumption that the rule articulated in
Hobby Lobby will transform when extended to the depersonalized behe-
moths (Wal-Mart, say) that are closely held in ways that may be legally
indistinguishable from Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood—even
while they bear no trace of the characteristics motivating the Court’s sym-
pathy in the initial case.  The implication is that the Justices, while not
articulating it, must assume some sort of dividing line between these dif-
ferent iterations of what are, definitionally, “close companies.”
Even as we acknowledge the presence of and the importance of diver-
sity in the goals, values, and preferences of close corporation shareholders,
the corporation more amenable to Hobby Lobby-style closeness would
still seem somehow to be (putatively, at least) more closely linked with
homogenous social norms.  The smallness of and homogeneity within the
shareholder group—presumed, as they were, to flow with the (again, un-
58. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 n.19 (2014) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2797
60. Hobby Lobby at 2774.
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defined) “closely held corporation”—allowed the Court to imagine the
corporation as more properly due “personal” considerations.
Commentators on the 2014 Hobby Lobby decision noted that, in leav-
ing the particular legal usage of the term “closely-held” unspecified—in
using the term as if colloquially, while depending heavily upon it as a
descriptor of what types of corporations were at issue in the case—the
Supreme Court left little guidance as to the nature and limits of the rules
enunciated in the opinion.61
Federal lawmakers stepped into the breach soon after with proposed
rules describing the nature of the closely held for-profit corporations that
would be able to claim the Hobby Lobby-generated exception to the
ACA.62  The final rule echoes the Court’s intuitions regarding the more
homogeneous and human-like nature of certain corporations,63 specifying
that the type of for-profit corporation it protected would be an entity that
“is not publicly traded, is majority-owned by a relatively small number of
individuals, and objects to providing contraceptive coverage based on its
owners’ religious beliefs.”64
Closeness as imagined in Hobby Lobby seems thus to have something
to do with a corporation that seems somehow more accountable to – more
organically bound up with – some set of human norms – making it more
easily and seemingly unproblematically assigned the relationships to that
set of norms that one might more properly attach to the (putatively homo-
geneous) individuals affiliated with it.65 This is the contingent corporation.
But if we value religious freedom, ought we not take seriously diverse
shareholder belief-preferences within corporate law? In the next section, I
will describe the ways in which the diverse voices of the shareholding ma-
jority and the minority matter.  And in closely held corporations, they
matter differently.
61. See, e.g., Elizabeth Pollman, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, THE
RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 149, 150 (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders &
Zoe Robinson, eds., 2016) (“[T]he Court’s anemic treatment of corporate law in Hobby
Lobby provides little guidance on how to implement and limit this landmark ruling. . . . As a
result, the Hobby Lobby opinion recognizes the religious liberty of business corporations but
leaves quite murky the corporate law mechanics of establishing and limiting this liberty.”).
62. See generally Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care
Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 134 (July 14, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).
63. Id (“This definition includes for-profit entities that are controlled and operated by
individual owners who are likely to have associational ties, are personally identified with the
entity, and can be regarded as conducting personal business affairs through the entity. These
entities appear to be the types of closely held for-profit entities contemplated by Hobby
Lobby. . .[.]”).
64. Id.
65. Culture in Corporate Law, supra note 47, at 375.
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III. PERSPECTIVES ON TAKING DIVERSE SHAREHOLDER
PREFERENCES SERIOUSLY
Hidden within the seeming homogeneity of shareholder preferences is
a productive tension.  Shareholders are much more diverse in their prefer-
ences than was visible to classical assumption and inquiry.66  Perhaps it is
in this acknowledgement that we might find the roots for a solution to the
“who speaks the culture” question—perhaps a solution already extant in
the law of corporations.
A. Where Corporate Law Disdains Majority Rule: Oppression Doctrine,
Appraisal, Fiduciary Duties
Corporate law already recognizes diverse shareholder preferences,
supporting some sets of claims by minority shareholders over and against
the majority—and sometimes over and against the profit motive of the
corporation outright.
Minority shareholders may make claims that they were “oppressed” by
the actions of the corporation’s insiders.  What counts as oppression?  Op-
pression may variously mean unfair, wrongful behavior inimical to the
trust shareholders must put into the companies in which they invest;
breaches of fiduciary duties between the shareholders of close corpora-
tions; and conduct disappointing the “reasonable expectations” of minor-
ity shareholders.67
Oppression doctrine may be seen to involve two different perspectives,
each of which yields dramatically different outcomes for oppression
claims.68  Courts understanding oppression to be about wrongful majority
behavior or about derogation of fiduciary duties to the minority read the
66. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation (a.k.a.
Criteria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77, 91 (2005) (“Although neoclassical econom-
ics assumes that shareholders come to the corporation with wealth maximization as their
goal, and most presumably do so, once uncertainty is introduced it would be surprising if
shareholder opinions did not differ on which course maximizes share value.”); Shareholder
Democracy And The Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, supra note 29; Grant M. Hayden
& Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote And The False Promise Of Shareholder Homoge-
neity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008) [hereinafter One Share, One Vote And The False
Promise Of Shareholder Homogeneity]; Marina Welker & David Wood, Shareholder Activism
and Alienation, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S57 (2011);.
67. See Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a
Remedy for Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25, 36-39 (1987); In re Kemp
& Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984); , supra note 15, at 761-62 (citing Robert
B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS. LAW. 699, 711-12
(1994)).
68. Moll, supra note 16, at 753 (countering commentary to the effect that the differ-
ence in perspective makes little practical difference (citing 2 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT
B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 9.29 (3d ed. 1994))); see F. HODGE
O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL’S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS
§ 7:13  (2d ed. 1985); see Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the
Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 322 (1990).
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doctrine from a “majority” perspective.69  When a court views oppression
doctrine from this perspective, Douglas Moll says, oppression is found
only where “the majority’s actions are not justified by a legitimate busi-
ness purpose.”70  When a court views the doctrine from the perspective of
the minority, on the other hand, it “generally finds oppression liability
when majority actions, whether justified or not, harm the interests of a
minority shareholder.”71
Utilization of a “reasonable expectations” test is one marker of a court
that is viewing oppression from a minority viewpoint.72  Moll quotes the
New York Court of Appeals for one statement of this view:
A shareholder who reasonably expected that ownership in the corporation
would entitle him or her to a job, a share of corporate earnings, a place in
corporate management, or some other form of security, would be oppressed in
a very real sense when others in the corporation seek to defeat those expecta-
tions and there exists no effective means of salvaging the investment.73
Note the difference in indicators here: a reasonable expectations test
seems more amenable to the tallying up of non-monetary wrongs. Claims
based on breaches of expectations in regard to close concerns would fall
under this category.
If oppression doctrine were to be the mechanism by which minority
shareholders in close corporations would press their claims regarding re-
ligious or other personal preferences, it might be expected that this view of
the test, more than the majority-focused takes on the doctrine, would pro-
vide some scope.
Beyond these obvious practical uses to which the doctrine might be
put, it may be argued that it also evinces space within corporate law for
further expansion of protection of minority shareholder concerns in
closely held corporations.  Chander takes oppression doctrine to be one
very direct expression of the central importance in corporate law of the
protection of minority shareholders.74  The doctrine, Chander argues, is
pointedly resistant to the “ruthless efficiency of the marketplace” assumed
in contractual analysis of corporate law.75  This is an especial concern in
69. Moll, supra note 16, at 762.
70. Id. at 752.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 764.
73. Id. (citing In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984)).
74. See Chander, supra note 34, at 121-23 (“Corporate law. . . routinely intrudes into
the corporation to secure the protection of minority shareholders against controlling persons
within corporations”; “much of corporate law can be explained as protective of minority
shareholders.”). Moll’s view might be seen as more cautious, emphasizing the ways in which
minority oppression doctrine can, and should, properly weight minority and majority inter-
ests. See Moll, supra note 16, at 754 (“[T]he shareholder oppression doctrine should operate
to protect the minority’s investment and to preserve, at least to some extent, the majority’s
decision-making discretion.”).
75. Chander, supra note 34, at 123, 144 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 22-35 (1991)). Chander applies to
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close corporations because of the likely presence in this context of share-
holder concerns that are not profit focused.76
Minority oppression doctrine evolved significantly beyond a previous
focus on involuntary dissolution as remedy,77 becoming instead “a statu-
tory ground for a wide variety of relief.”78  This development is important
because of the diversity of concerns and values motivating minority share-
holder claims within closely held corporations.  As close shareholder con-
cerns are unlikely to be quantifiable in terms of a money amount in the
same way as might profit concerns, remedies other than dissolution may
be more suited to them.
Another form of protection for minority shareholders lies in fiduciary
duties reaching from corporate insiders to outsiders.  In the face of the
limits of majority rule, directors and officers hold certain duties to minor-
ity shareholders.  Fiduciary duty—”[t]he standby rule of corporate
law”79—has been defined to require “actors to behave in the way that they
would have agreed to do by contract, if detailed contracts could be
reached and enforced at no cost.”80
In keeping with the anti-formalist theme that characterizes corporate
law, it is not only directors and officers that owe such duties to the minor-
ity: when a majority shareholder comes to take on the practical role of the
directors and officers—that is to say, when they come to have control over
close corporations a contractual approach to voting earlier articulated by Easterbrook and
Fischel: “We argue that the states’ legal rules generally provide investors with the sort of
voting arrangements they would find desirable if contracts could be arranged and enforced at
lose cost.” (quoting Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 398). In the 1983 work, Eas-
terbrook and Fischel explicitly distinguished this discussion from their own, noting that “the
free-riding problems that make the understanding of voting such a challenge do not apply
with the same force to closely held firms.” (Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 399
n.8.).
76. Control in Corporate Law, supra note 35, at 1214; Daniel S. Kleinberger, Why Not
Good Faith? The Foibles of Fairness in the Law of Close Corporations, 16 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1143, 1148 (1990); Chander, supra note 34, at 143 (“The cause of action for oppression
developed out of the growing recognition that minority shareholders in close corporations
were susceptible to abuse by the majority, through non-pro rata distributions and other forms
of self-dealing. The close corporation context, in which personal emoluments such as employ-
ment form a significant part of the return on investment and in which ownership shares are
relatively illiquid, leaves the minority at heightened risk of exploitation.”). See also Moll,
supra note 16, at 754, 758 n.44. Because of these diverse priorities of close corporation share-
holders, Moll argues, “reasonable close corporation shareholders would not reach an under-
standing that any majority conduct benefiting the corporation is permissible.” Moll’s
approach is thus contractually oriented, seeking the enforcement of “the likely understand-
ings that reasonable investors would have reached if, at the venture’s inception, they had
bargained over the protection of their investments and the prerogatives of the majority.
77. Haynsworth, supra note 67, at 26 (“historically such suits have been the most com-
mon litigation remedy used by aggrieved shareholders”).
78. Moll, supra note 16, at 760.
79. Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 401.
80. Id. See also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Trans-
actions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter Corporate Control Transactions].
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specific action by the corporation—they too take on certain duties to the
minority.81  Thus, the majority is limited both in the extent of the control
that “control” provides and in the ways in which this control may be exer-
cised.  As Adolf Berle noted, “[t]he function of control is to choose a man-
agement. This choice must be responsibly exercised.”82  The notion of
fiduciary duty hinges to a large extent upon ideas of fairness, responsibil-
ity, and differentials of power.83
As it turns out, then, while majority rule is central to corporate law,
corporate law is actually remarkably sensitive to the protection of minority
shareholding.84  Chander has argued (albeit not without pushback) that
the protection of dissenting minority shareholder is a, if not the, central
edifice of corporate law.85
Chander makes his point by way of comparison of the treatment of
minority interests in corporate as against constitutional law: “Where con-
stitutional law sees only one race—’American’—corporate law recognizes
minority status as a central datum for legal decision.”86  For example,
while Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.87 has come to be seen to be about share-
holder wealth maximization, the true concern of the court “was with
Henry Ford’s minority co-owners; any effect on Henry Ford’s own fi-
nances was incidental.”  Indeed, “[t]he court held not that insiders must
simply maximize shareholder wealth, but that they must do so
equitably.”88
A further point of contrast with constitutional law may be found in
corporate law’s attention to granular context, to “relations of power within
81. Control in Corporate Law, supra note 35, at 1222 (“[T]he law has long recognized
and imposed certain liabilities on the holders of control if they use their influence over direc-
tors to cause specific corporate action. . . . [W]here holders of control, without assuming the
title of directors, move into the directors’ room or the managerial offices and specifically
direct corporate action, they are held to the same standards of conduct which apply to direc-
tors.”); Chander, supra note 35, at 138 (quoting Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)
(“A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of
stockholders.”)).
82. Control in Corporate Law, supra note 35, at 1220.
83. Chander, supra note 34, at 157 (“the fiduciary duties that make up much of the law
of corporate governance rely centrally on notions of ‘fairness.’ In interested shareholder
transactions, for example, the controlling shareholder bears the burden under Delaware law
of proving ‘inherent fairness.’”) (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.
1983)). Chander claims that Joy v. North “can only be understood as a case dissecting power
relations, even if such dissection is in the service of shareholder wealth. The court’s decision
to intervene, over the dissent’s objection of ‘overregulation,’ resulted from the court’s con-
cern with power relations in the corporate sphere. The court was concerned about the ab-
sence of power in the shareholder class.” Id. at 133.
84. See generally Chander, supra note 34.
85. Id. at 119.
86. Id. at 120 (citations omitted).
87. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
88. Chander, supra note 34, at 126.
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the corporation.”89  It is not mere numerical majority of shareholding that
concerns corporate law.  Instead, “[c]orporate law does not define ‘minor-
ity’ shareholders on the basis of numbers alone . . . Even minority holders
can exercise control of the corporation.”90
Stephen Bainbridge cautions us against wholesale acceptance of
Chander’s insistence upon the protection of minority interests as a central,
even constitutive concern in corporate law.91  Bainbridge acknowledges
that to the extent that minority shareholder protection is central to corpo-
rate law, however, it is likely to be important in the context of close
corporations.92
Whether or not one buys into the rest of Chander’s argument, it is
clear that protection of minority shareholders is and has long been impor-
tant in corporate law.93  In Chander’s words, “Corporate law springs into
action—becomes nontrivial—on behalf of minority shareholders.”94
Berle wrote that “control” in corporate law may be viewed to be of
two different flavors – “absolute” control (control outright) and “working
control.”95  In the first, control is established by means of a majority of
stock held by one or more shareholders who act in concert, or in some
cases where such an individual or group holds a substantial minority of the
shares while the remainder of shareholding is splintered among many
small, diversely oriented shareholdings.96  Working control, however, “in-
volves an additional element which is in fact a quasi-political process.  This
element is the capacity to mobilize other shareholders.”97
The wider point here is that corporate law concerns itself with more
than formalism and bright-line rules.  What is on display here is precisely
not the formalistic equality that Stephen Bainbridge remarks upon in
Chander’s argument.98  Instead, corporate law is concerned with context
89. Id. at 163.
90. Id.
91. Stephen M. Bainbridge, There is No Affirmative Action for Minorities, Shareholder
or Otherwise, in Corporate Law, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 71 (2008), http://yalelawjournal
.org/forum/there-is-no-affirmative-action-for-minorities-shareholder-and-otherwise-in-corpo-
rate-law.
92. Id. at 71-72.
93. Control in Corporate Law, supra note 35, at 1212 (“the rules derive chiefly from a
time when corporations were still truly private and relatively small, and they were and still
are directed primarily toward the protection of the property interests of minority
stockholders”).
94. Chander, supra note 34, at 127.
95. Control in Corporate Law, supra note 35, at 1213.
96. Id.
97. Id. Alternately, management working control may be at work where, since “there
is no substantial minority and the stock is widely scattered among a large number of stock-
holders, capacity to direct the proxy machinery is all that is necessary.” Id.
98. Bainbridge, supra note 91 (“Chander overstates the extent to which corporate law
values principles like equal treatment. To the contrary, corporate law explicitly permits dis-
crimination among shareholders.”).
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in a way that reflects law’s own flexibility: “[t]he constant need to assess
power dynamics,” Chander notes, “reflects the contingent nature of law
itself.”99  Corporate law concerns itself with the real world of corporate
power relations in a way that constitutional law has not seemed to do.100 It
is for this reason that corporate law demands constant re-theorization,
constant evaluation of the suitability of its norms and precepts to the lived
world of corporations.
B. Arguments from Constitutional Rights
Political speech and religious rights are so important that their infringe-
ment can give rise to constitutional claims—another way in which the
voices of dissenting shareholders might be recognized.
In light of the ineffectiveness of corporate democracy for shareholder
voice and agency, a number of commentators have argued that Citizens
United gives rise to forced speech issues.  Justice Stevens led this charge in
Citizens United itself, noting that “[i]nterwoven with Austin’s concern to
protect the integrity of the electoral process is a concern to protect the
rights of shareholders from a kind of coerced speech.”101  Yet there are
long-standing critiques of the forced speech argument.
Howard Wasserman argued before the advent of the Citizens United
era that forced speech is faulty as a rational for limiting corporate speech
because:
First, a parallel standard is not followed when it comes to associations other
than profitmaking corporations even though a similar problem [regarding
member-dissent] could arise. Second, it is by no means obvious that the share-
holders realistically can be deemed to have been forced to speak. Third, even
assuming one can make such an identification, the relative cost of exit is not so
high as to lead to the conclusion that the shareholder’s expression actually has
been forced.102
More recently, however, many of these critiques have not been borne out.
Scholars of labor and corporate law have noted that “a parallel stan-
dard” is not followed for unions—instead unions are much more harshly
99. Chander, supra note 34, at 164.
100. Id. at 174 (“[C]orporate law does not adopt an approach of formal equality, refus-
ing to recognize differences among shareholders. Corporate law does not confuse equality
with sameness. Indeed, corporate law even goes so far as to impose special duties on control-
ling shareholders and managers that are not borne by minority shareholders. Corporate law
recognizes what this initiative would deny: In order to do justice, law must keep in mind the
identity of the individuals involved—specifically, whether they are controlling or minority
members of the relevant group.”).
101. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 977 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
102. Howard M. Wasserman, What’s Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and
the Theory of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 271-281 (1998).
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controlled than corporations as regards dissenters’ forced speech
claims.103
The question of state action may be approached directly;104 it has also
been argued by reference to union cases.105  The actions of private sector
organizations have been seen as state action because of the cost or diffi-
culty of exit, but the cases finding state action in private unions have been
distinguished by the argument that it is easy to disentangle oneself from
investment in a corporation, but burdensome to leave a union.106
In fact, many of the concerns articulated in regard to forced speech
take on a particular salience in the case of close corporations.  The combi-
nation of two central norms in corporate law—majority rule and central-
ized control—present a particular set of difficulties for the minority
shareholder in this context. In the close corporation case the selling option
is practically moot: by definition, it is difficult and costly to withdraw from
a close corporation.  The project of disentangling oneself will often neces-
sitate having to find new employment.107
103. See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Citizens, United and Citizens United: The future of La-
bor Speech Rights? 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (2011); Eric John Finseth, Shareholder Activ-
ism by Public Pension Funds and the Rights of Dissenting Employees Under the First
Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289 (2010); Reza Dibadj, Expressive Rights for
Shareholders After Citizens United?, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 459, 467 (2011); Catherine L. Fisk &
Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. SEIU Local 1000,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1025 (2013).
104. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. S.B. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 777 (1961) (Douglas,
J., concurring) (“Since neither Congress nor the state legislatures can abridge those rights,
they cannot grant the power to private groups to abridge them.”); Adolf Berle, Constitutional
Limitations on Corporate Activity—Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Ec-
onomic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 952 (1952) (“Implicitly, it would seem, state action in
granting a corporate charter assumes that the corporation will not exercise its power (granted
in theory at least to forward a state purpose) in a manner forbidden the state itself.”).
105. Fisk & Chemerinksy, supra note 103 at 1025-26 (“The law has long been that both
public sector and private sector unions violate the First Amendment rights or statutory rights
of dissenting employees when they spend money from the organization’s general treasury to
advance a political message without giving the employees the chance to opt out of having
their fees support political activity.”); Finseth, supra note 103, at 347. Finseth notes that the
Second, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have declined to see state action in private sector actors,
while the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have done so. Id. at 348-49.
106. See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 102, at 275-76 (“the shareholder probably will lose
nothing in the transaction. To the extent that the corporate speech somehow causes the
stock’s price to fall, the shareholder has other remedies, such as shareholder suit for breach
of fiduciary duty. . . .  Having to forego a particular investment opportunity. . .simply is not of
the same magnitude as the obligation to find new employment.”); Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra
note 103, at 1060-61 (“The real reason why the Court thinks corporate political spending is
not compelled speech and union political spending is was the one stated in an earlier cam-
paign finance case, First National Bank of Boston v. Belotti: workers are compelled to fund
union political speech but shareholders are not because the latter can simply sell their shares
in the corporation but the former would have to quit their job.”).
107. Moll, supra note 16, at 757, 759 (“In the public corporation, the minority share-
holder can escape . . . abuses of power by simply selling his shares on the market. By defini-
tion, however, there is no ready market for the stock of a close corporation.”).
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The closely held corporation thus seems an especially ripe context for
forced speech claims.
Speech and religion are rights that are so important that they give rise
to constitutional claims.  This seems to indicate that they are rights that
should be protected at a more quotidian level, too; at the level of the struc-
ture of corporate governance, rather than after things have gone wrong.
Thus it is that the more complex answer to the question of the corpora-
tion’s cultural voice requires that we rethink the very nature of corporate
democracy.
IV. RETHINKING CORPORATE DEMOCRACY
Do current doctrines regarding minority oppression, fiduciary relation-
ships, and appraisal rights have the capacity to accommodate shareholder
claims based on corporate religious rights?  The notions of investor expec-
tations and of fairness have a great deal of stretch to them.  If these con-
cerns were now to take the shape of the voice, belief, representation, and
identity issues signaled by Hobby Lobby, these and other remedies might
provide useful courses of action. In this section, I will consider the useful-
ness of the arguments for recognition of minority dissent that I have sur-
veyed in the context of religious dissent post-Hobby Lobby
Corporate law can and does take minority preferences into account.
But how might it take these preferences into account regarding matters
such as “belief”?  Are the mechanisms of corporate democracy sufficient
where what is at stake is the question of what is to be the “deeply held
belief” of the closely held corporation with which you, a human individual
with your own deeply held beliefs, identify?  The question is difficult
partly because of the role an idealized, standardized, homogenized role
that the shareholder classically has played in corporate theory.108 The
shareholders to whom the fictive corporate person is accountable are fic-
tive, too.109
By way of illustration, I think here of anthropologist Marilyn
Strathern’s conception of audit cultures.110  Audit practices, bureaucratic
assessment procedures grown near-ubiquitous in the neoliberal era, have
as a concept “broken loose from [their] moorings in finance and account-
ing,” spreading to “all kinds of reckonings, evaluations, and measure-
ments.” According to Strathern they now become “a distinct cultural
artifact.”111
108. Moll, supra note 16, at 756-62 and accompanying text.
109. See Daniel Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate Manag-
ers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021 (1996).
110. Marilyn Strathern, Improving Ratings: Audit in the British University System, 5
EUR. REV. 305 (1997).
111. Marilyn Strathern, Introduction: New Accountabilities, in AUDIT CULTURES: AN-
THROPOLOGICAL STUDIES IN ACCOUNTABILITY ETHICS 1, 2 (Marilyn Strathern, ed., 2000).
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The “self” described and thus the self that is monitored in an audit will
be an approximation toward a prescribed version of self—and this con-
struction of a self for audit resembles the same process for the constitution
of a “self” for an internal constituency.  In each case the act of making-
legible is a prime site for mistranslation, exacerbated by recursive re-trans-
lations of that self.  Mistranslations, of course, can be wildly and uniquely
productive.  Having examined oneself and manufactured one’s “mission
statement,” it is possible to shape oneself in increasing orientation to that
desired goal. One artifact this audit-self reproduces, then, is itself.  Or a
reasonable facsimile: a new, different, prescribed self which in turn shapes
one’s self self.
The institution’s holding itself to “best value” standards (for example)
in order to render an account of itself to a constituency thus requires also
an attempt at an accounting of constituents.  The constituency must be
made to appear “an entity with which communication can take place”112
—an operation necessarily involving some schematization of both the in-
stitution and its putative constituency.  The success of this move will in-
volve the institution’s representation of the constituency for the
constituency in a way that aims to make the constituency visible to itself,
legible to itself, which implies the necessity of the institution’s careful
management of the recognition and the elision of difference.113
The proposed rules for for-profit religious exemptions to contraceptive
coverage will generate similar alignments.  Audit, Strathern noted, creates
performing subjects who shape their behavior toward the strictures of au-
dit in interesting ways.  Post-Hobby Lobby, and in the wake of the pro-
posed rules, questions remain open regarding how companies will behave
as for-profit religious entities, and how Hobby Lobby and its progeny will
come to shape these behaviors.
Since—even outside of constitutional claims—religion is special, in rec-
ognizing for-profit corporate rights to it we need to put in place stronger-
than-usual protections for individual rights to and from religion.  This
means that we ought only defer to corporate demands for religious exemp-
tions where the integral nature of the religious character of the organiza-
tion makes it so clear, so important, and so obvious as to justify the
silencing of the rights of the individual.  We do not want Wal-Mart claim-
ing this exemption and being treated as Christian (or any other religion)
just because they say they are, or switch a couple of marketing phrases
around, or check a couple of boxes.
This requirement for a dyed-in-the-wool religiosity was arguably pre-
sent even in Hobby Lobby’s vague wording.  Justice Alito’s seemingly
glancing mention of directors/officers/employees was an acknowledgement
that these are decisions necessarily far messier than your average corpo-
112. Marilyn Strathern, Robust Knowledge and Fragile Futures, in GLOBAL ASSEM-
BLAGES: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND ETHICS AS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 464, 468
(Aihwa Ong & Stephen J. Collier, eds., 2008).
113. Id.
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rate governance issue.  Other constituencies will matter in this
determination.
Yet we know that we may not inquire into the guts (sincerity, intensity)
of religious faith in these circumstances—we are barred from looking at
the specifics—so how should we think about that kind of religious com-
pany versus a dyed-in-the-wool religious company?  Is there some sort of
difference, or are we satisfied to let the simple box-checking claim (“This
is a religious company because we said so!”) trump possible internal dis-
sent, a conflict likely to be gravely injurious to very important individual
rights?
If we are to be able to distinguish Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga
Wood from any old closely held corporation that claims these rights, we
should have that as a factor: context, character, dyed-in-the-wool-ness of
the close concern characteristic the corporation is claiming.
Thus in theorizing closely held corporations and minority dissent, trust,
community, and solidarity become tools to leaven otherwise stridently
standardized aspects of corporate law.
To use such tools is to put into practice Hayden and Bodie’s insistence
that what I earlier characterized as “lumpy” decision-making might in
some circumstances enable better, not worse decisions.114  “Better” will
here mean decisions that capture “what the people want” while properly
taking into account their ethical and cultural commitments to, or aversions
to, the proposed corporate action.
After all, if shareholders are more diverse than assumed in classical
theory,115 and if, post-Hobby Lobby, shareholder value is de-legitimized
as all-consuming concern, then Easterbrook and Fischel’s arguments from
Arrow’s theorem lose a fair measure of their force.  The weakened legiti-
macy both of the attribution of an overarching profit-preference to an
imagined standardized shareholder, and of the overweening importance of
agency cost-reduction (a concern frequently, albeit not necessarily, framed
in terms of the centrality of maximizing share value) brings with it further
changes.  To wit: other values that are held to be similarly important—like
those types of beliefs made important in Hobby Lobby—become qualified
to stand toe-to-toe with profit maximization.
I have called these “close concerns”: those with regard to a subset of
expressive rights based in personal attributes, and traditionally considered
applicable only to natural persons.  These concerns are for things—like
free exercise, like religious belief, like racial or cultural background—
newly extendable to corporations and newly treated as indistinguishable in
any relevant sense from the way in which it is protected for human per-
sons.  Share value becomes, here, just another value among many that
might legitimately fall under the purview of corporate law.  Justifications
114. See Hayden and Bodie, supra note 33.
115. Id.
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for the prioritization of efficiency must now contend with a newly legiti-
mized need to take such strongly held preferences seriously.
This set of changes necessitates decision-making processes that take
into account the special nature of these close concerns, and takes seriously
the idea that this special nature justifies the potential decrease in efficiency
or processual elegance—while also avoiding the specter of immobility.
While some “lumpiness” is good for decision-making, however, clots are
not.  Thus it must be acknowledged that, regardless of the import of these
“close concerns,” minority belief-preferences will need to be disregarded
to some extent if business is to be done.  A remaining issue, then, is the
formulation of some balancing mechanism by which we may determine the
extent to which we should be comfortable allowing minority close con-
cerns to be discounted or ignored.
Recognizing in Citizens United the first few frames of the shifts out-
lined above, Lucian Bebchuk and Robert Jackson offer a number of prac-
tical suggestions regarding the structure of corporate political speech
decision-making.116  Because the decision-making processes regarding
corporate political speech are undifferentiated from those regarding ordi-
nary business decisions, note Bebchuk and Jackson, they lack shareholder
input, a role for independent directors, or disclosure requirements— “the
safeguards that corporate law rules establish for special corporate deci-
sions.”117 The provision of safeguards such as these for political speech
decision-making is sensible, the authors argue.
Not only may the decisions of management regarding the corporation’s
political speech diverge significantly from shareholder preferences, and
not only might these divergences have real financial implications; to the
impact of these two factors is added the force multiplier of the “special
expressive significance” speech decisions hold.118  This significance ren-
ders speech decisions materially different from the ordinary business deci-
sions with which they are currently classed.
But the improvements suggested by Bebchuk and Jackson cannot ad-
dress the close concerns that become important post-Hobby Lobby for
two primary reasons.  First, Hobby Lobby de-centered the primacy of
profit; the opinion gave the Supreme Court’s imprimatur to arguments
that values outside of profit are proper foci for for-profit businesses.  Sec-
ond, political speech rights and rights to religious exercise tend to be
framed in different rhetorical terms; these differences become very sharp
in the wake of Hobby Lobby.
Bebchuk and Jackson’s approach to dissent from corporate political
speech stems from concerns for shareholder wealth maximization, and is
built on related assumptions that become problematic post-Hobby
116. See generally, Corporate Political Speech: Who Decides?, supra note 6.
117. Id. at 84.
118. Id.
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Lobby.119  We are in need of an account that does not depend so heavily
on an assumption of shareholder wealth maximization as its primary
concern.
Further, post-Citizens United, the issues, and their solutions, could
quite properly be framed as procedural—the manner in which Bebchuk
and Jackson frame them.  Post-Hobby Lobby, however, we do not speak
only of political speechmaking by the corporation, and its possible colli-
sions with shareholders political preferences.  Political speech rights may
legitimately be framed in terms of the rights of listeners to hear (and, as
Citizens United made clear, they have come to be so framed) rather than
those of some thought-bearing speaker to speak.  Free exercise rights, and
other rights like them, are much more incontrovertibly personal.
Conceptions of the behavior of the corporation have long evinced an
individualistic and atomistic stance.  Indeed, one popular film on the cor-
poration worked to diagnose – psychologically—the corporation’s fail-
ings—as an individual.120  It is a familiar trope, this imagining of the
corporate person as some individual whose behavior may be analyzed as
might that of a human individual.  We might thus speak in terms of the
(singular, unitary) corporation’s (singular, unitary) identity or belief.  Ac-
cording to both to lay understandings and to legal ones, the corporation
can speak with one voice.121
Yet we must think of the corporation not as a bounded object but in-
stead in terms of the interaction of multiple, diffuse tensions and forces—
its various parts marked by and allotted with powers of agentive action
and the disavowal of agentive action; with responsibility and lack of re-
sponsibility.122 Hobby Lobby appears to indicate that the law sees the
corporation as simultaneously “simply a bunch of people” and something
separate from the individuals involved with it. This means that the individ-
ual—and the close concern preferences of minority shareholders—ought
not be imagined to disappear, to be subsumed within the corporate total-
ity.  Corporate personal attributes (the belief underpinning a free exercise
claim; the “intellect and conscience” underpinning an act of political
speech) and the nature of the rights arising out of them can only be under-
stood in relational terms.
Supermajorities, shareholder input, independent directors, and disclo-
sure requirements thus provide no solution, because none avoids the fun-
damental conundrum of belief, identity, or religious exercise by fiat.
119. See Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 408-10; Arrow’s Theorem and the
Exclusive Shareholder Franchise, supra note 33, at 2071, 2081-82; Grofman, supra note 33, at
1549, and accompanying text.
120. THE CORPORATION (Big Picture Media Corporation 2003).
121. We might consider newspapers, “official statements” of sports teams, or political
preferences of the Boy Scouts as an organization.
122. See Lawrence Rosen, The Cultural Analysis of Others’ Interior States, in OTHER
INTENTIONS: CULTURAL CONTEXTS AND THE ATTRIBUTION OF INNER STATES 3, 3 (Lawrence
Rosen, ed., 1995).
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Yet no church, no tribe, no nation may be imagined to be a homoge-
nous monolith—in other arenas some trampling of the minority opinion
will occur as a matter of course.  The concern here is not, however, that no
minority political opinion, religious belief, exercise claim, or other close
preference should ever be overwhelmed by that of the corporation. In-
stead, the concern is for the acquisition of some mechanism by which we
may be sure that the close concern that the corporation enacts is not top-
down—that it is instead “baked-in,” cultural, deeply seeded.
The central questions and concerns undergirding the Supreme Court’s
contingent understanding of the nature of the corporation and its place in
society in many ways resemble— yet also materially contrast with—those
that undergirded early twentieth-century corporatist thought.
Both of the most prominent American versions of corporatism center
on an idea of the corporation or group as wound into and responsible for
things that we in the twenty-first century will tend to think of as entirely
social.123  And the way this made sense is interesting: in each of these
iterations of the concept the idea was that taking care of the social weal
was necessary to the economic success of the country.  That is was a factor
in it and would necessarily lead to it. And this again is around the edge of
the Great Depression, with all of these minds at work desperately figuring
out how to do capitalism right; how to make a capitalism that does not
cannibalize itself.  What they came up with were versions of corporate law
wherein these deeply felt social or community preferences were not out of
place in business judgments but instead were at their center.
Central to Adolf Berle’s version of corporatism was a recognition of
the diverse values that needed to be held aloft, in tension, for it all to
work.124  The idea that what you were doing was not creating a homoge-
nous community but instead a community that gained its “selfness” out of
these various tensions—the corporation acting as “systemic glue” for these
varied parts.125
Merrick Dodd’s corporatism took to heart the notion that the business
community knows best, that those in control of these powerful, successful
corporations likely have a better-than-most notion of what we ought to do
123. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 923,
936 (1984) (referencing ADOLF BERLE, THE THREE FACES OF POWER 157-216 (1967)); Vot-
ing in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 397 (“Berle and Means prescribed not reform of the
election machinery, the better to have investors rule managers, but social control of corpora-
tions. . . . ‘[P]ublic policy rather than private cupidity’ would make important corporate deci-
sions and decree what to do with the profits.”).
124. See Romano, supra note 120, at 936-37(referencing ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER
WITHOUT PROPERTY: A NEW DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY 2-3, 8
(1959); ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDNER MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 356 (1932)).
125. Id., (quoting ADOLF A. BERLE, THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLU-
TION 148 (1955)).
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to make our economy shine and to watch over human welfare.126  This
idea was not necessarily far-fetched: Dodd was looking to the sincerely
pro-social behaviors of the philanthropy-minded business magnates of his
time, looking at the way the most successful of these seemed also to be the
ones committed to including in the role duties as trustees of social
welfare.127
While for Adolf Berle there was a difference between social engineer-
ing and behaving in a way that mitigates or prevents the corporation’s
working harm in the world,128 Dodd’s version of corporatism took this as
a uselessly blurry line—accordingly, his version did not hold within it this
particular type of nuance.129  There appeared to exist, at least in 1932,
trust that socially responsive behavior by managers will be socially respon-
sible behavior.
And this appears to be the logic that holds in Hobby Lobby—the sty-
mying of access to birth control that is the result of these corporations’
protection of their assets becomes merely these families’ action to make
the world better, no different from, for example, Starbucks’ process of
moving to renewable energy sources.130
Following the Court’s reasoning one sees something right about this—
something sympathetic, something almost human-like in the corporation’s
attentiveness to these social mores.  It is this intuition that appeared to
motivate the Court.  It was responding to this feeling that in this case, and
specifically in this case with a corporation they could characterize as
closely held, there was a deeper connection between what the aggregate of
human beings who are involved in the corporation are doing and what the
corporation-as-entity does.
The mechanism by which this works might be that it becomes easier to
imagine the corporation as an agent of its shareholders and managers’
complicity in some activity when one can imagine the corporation as a
social being.  The anthropologist Clifford Geertz described the human be-
ing as “an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has
spun.”131  We might imagine the corporation to be wrapped up in vines of
social norms and social restraint—these webs of significance woven who
knows how.
What, then, is the difference when you have persons unbound by the
type of moral and social constraints and expectations that the individual
has (and to which Geertz referred) —constraints that attend and modify
126. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist
Origins: Adolf Berle and the Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. L. 99, 123-27 (2008).
127. See generally id. at 124-27.
128. See generally Adolf A. Berle, Corporate Decision-Making and Social Control, 24
BUS. L. 149 (1968).
129. See generally Bratton & Wachter, supra note 126, at 123-24.
130. STARBUCKS COFFEE COMPANY, STARBUCKS GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 7-8
(2015), http://globalassets.starbucks.com/assets/ee8121c1a6554399b554d126228d52ed.pdf.
131. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
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the rights when they are pinned to individuals?  And is the answer to this
question different in the case of a corporation that does become suffused
with these ties, with some particular social personality?
In Hobby Lobby, the Court employed not only an image of the corpo-
ration as an aggregate of human people, but also added to it a type of folk
transcendentalism whereby out of the beliefs and preferences of these
people sprung an organizational unity—the Court’s conception of the cor-
poration as holding or (if you like) exercising or (if you like) being con-
strained by Christian beliefs.
For an anthropologist, state corporate law, with its commitment to ma-
jority rule, is problematic as a tool in imagining the cultural norms of the
corporation as an entity.  But it also presents problems when what is em-
ployed is a folk or an instrumental notion of culture. This is counterintui-
tive—on these views, corporate culture is something that may (and likely
will) come “from the top down,” and might be established by vote or com-
pany guidelines. But even here, issues abound.
Majority rule is problematic as a practical matter for anthropologists
(with our insistence that is just not the way culture, religion, racial identity,
and the like work).  Culture is never only top-down.
Further, taking majority rule to determine not merely corporate behav-
ior, but also of corporate interior lives fails as a matter of policy: “religious
belief by majority rule” sounds in any case like a notion of which we ought
to be deeply suspicious.
Even were majority rule a proper determinant of the organization’s
cultural, religious, or racial categories, the way shareholding has evolved
over the years means that in most corporations, actual human individuals
are not making these decisions—shareholding switches quickly, is diffuse,
is often institutionally based.132  Finally, as many have argued, other con-
stituencies matter too for the question of the character of the
corporation.133
To the extent that the contingent corporation may meaningfully said to
possess close concern attributes, it is made so not merely by courts’ impri-
matur or by a unilateral decision from its controlling shareholders, but by
processes such as those upon which the corporatism of Berle focused.  Per-
sonal attributes of controlling stockholders or managers may factor in, but
so will the norms and expectations of workers, lenders, customers, the rel-
evant community and other constituencies.  Law will matter, too.  The spe-
cifics of state corporate law will be one of many factors, held in tension.
Law will shape the social characteristics of the corporation—but the
132. For studies advancing alternate versions of the thesis that shareholders are less
powerful than the “ownership” trope has them appear, see, e.g., One Share, One Vote And
The False Promise of Shareholder Primacy, supra note 66; Marina Welker & David Wood,
Shareholder Activism and Alienation, 52 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S57, S57-S69 (2011).
133. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 280  (1999); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 126, at 146.
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meaning of corporate personal characteristics for the law will come from
these contextual factors.
V. CONCLUSION: HOW SHOULD CLOSE CONCERNS MATTER?
Minority dissent regarding corporate religious issues in closely held
corporations may be legitimately protected along lines of oppression,
along lines of forced speech, and along lines of the establishment of relig-
ion.  Thus this dissent is something worth paying attention to—and pro-
tecting.  This is the case, however, even outside of oppression or
constitutional claims.  Minority shareholders dissenting from corporate re-
ligious decisions ought to be accorded protection not after things have
gone so wrong as to result in oppression or constitutional claims but on a
quotidian basis, as a matter of plain old corporate governance.
In Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court left it to the rules of group deci-
sion-making articulated within state corporate law—majority rule—to dis-
cern the character of the religious belief and exercise of the corporations
at issue.  Because of the importance of individual conscience in American
law and culture, majority rule is insufficient here: this is an issue deserving
of much more thoughtful consideration.
Because religious belief is a uniquely human characteristic, even if we
respect rights of corporations for it we should weight effects upon and
dissent by human persons more.  Just as the law applies specifically and
differentially to parents versus their children, to minors versus adults, con-
text will be important to make sure things are done properly here.
The undertaking is an important one because these are rights con-
ceived to go particularly with a conception of a person that has attach-
ments to a community that will hold it accountable, that it will be a person
interlaced, for good or for ill, with the norms of that community.  It is just
this sort of community norm—this accountability to some web of social
relationships ingrained in the corporation—that is exemplified in both the
American versions and the European versions of corporatism that were
prominent in the last century.
One solution may lie in the normalization of cumulative voting for
closely held corporations.  Cumulative voting became extinct for public
firms because of its “lumpiness” and because efficiency was such an in-
credibly (and rationally) central value.  Cumulative voting caused holdup
power to be “distributed widely.”134  But in the closely held corporation,
and on close issues, this lumpiness and even its attendant holdup problem
are likely a good thing.  Religious freedom is not something we want
trumped by efficiency considerations.
Whatever their solutions in practice, these broader concerns require
broader bases of analysis.  What is necessary is some mechanism ensuring
that the close concerns a corporation puts into play are not merely top-
134. Voting in Corporate Law, supra note 24, at 409.
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down edicts, but instead arise organically from the “community” of the
corporation.
Where corporate law sees fit to disentangle personal rights for corpora-
tions from shareholders’ characteristics, it becomes imperative that the law
take special care not to trample the personal characteristics of individuals
in attempting to respect the personal characteristics of corporations. While
the mechanisms of corporate democracy may be modified to this end, such
modifications will require just the type of context-sensitive inquiry for
which the proposed rules call—and that Hobby Lobby left undone.
